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Abstract
In this paper we study a transmission power-tune/control problem in the context of 802.11 Wireless Local Area
Networks (WLANs) with multiple (and possibly densely deployed) access points (APs). Previous studies on power
control tend to focus on one aspect of the control, either its effect on transmission capacity (PHY layer effect)
assuming simultaneous transmissions, or its effect on contention order (MAC layer effect) by maximizing spatial
reuse. We observe that power control has a dual effect: it affects both spatial reuse and capacity of active transmission;
moreover, maximizing the two separately is not always aligned in maximizing system throughput and can even point in
opposite directions. In this paper we introduce an optimization formulation that takes into account this dual effect, by
measuring the impact of transmit power on system performance from both PHY and MAC layers. We show that such
an optimization problem is intractable and develop an analytical framework to construct simple yet efficient solutions.
Through numerical results, we observe clear benefits of this dual-effect model compared to solutions obtained that
try to maximize spatial reuse and transmission capacity separately. This problem does not invoke cross-layer design,
as the only degree of freedom in design resides with transmission power. It however highlights the complexity in
tuning certain design parameters, as the change may manifest itself differently at different layers which may be at
odds.
We further form a game theoretical framework and investigate above power-tune problem in a strategic network.
We show that with decentralized and strategic users, the Nash Equilibrium (N.E.) of the corresponding game is
in-efficient and thereafter we propose a punishment based mechanism to enforce users to adopt the social optimal
strategy profile under both perfect and imperfect sensing environments.
2I. INTRODUCTION
Power-tune has emerged as an important issue in an IEEE 802.11 WLAN network of multiple interacting
users (Access Points, or APs). Earlier classical results with focus on power-tune may be classified into the
following two independent approaches.
The first relies on a PHY-layer framework in interference-bounded networks, i.e., the optimal power-
tune problem is defined with respect to the Signal-Noise-Ratio (SNR) of each AP or the entire network.
Within this framework, each AP’s transmission power has two contradicting roles: The first is that a
higher transmission power will improve the noise resistance capability for its own communication and
thus potentially the network capacity. The other role is the unavoidable interaction with other APs. A
higher transmission power will contribute higher noise/interference to other APs using the same channel
(we assume Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing, OFDM, at PHY layer and thus we will not
consider intra-channel interference). Many results have been established in this framework with different
techniques focusing on either centralized or distributed solutions.
The second class of results stems from MAC layer techniques by trying to reduce the level of contention
within a network, or improving spatial reuse order, as more generally referred to. Specifically, when users
fall into each other’s audible range, transmission back-off under CSMA/CA is triggered to resolve contention
and enable sharing. Therefore, decreasing users’ transmission range helps improve spatial reuse of a given
channel. It follows that they are often modeled as congestion games or other similar graph problems (more
in Section VII).
Even though conceptually both frameworks aim at optimizing system performance, e.g., overall through-
put, the technical objectives and thus the net impact under the two are clearly not always aligned, and
in fact can be quite different and even point in opposite directions. To illustrate, consider maximizing
users’ achievable throughput or capacity without considering the induced spatial contention relationship;
the resulting power-tune can create areas of very high contention order. Thus, even though a user’s (or the
network’s) transmission capacity/rate maybe maximized on a per transmission basis, significant amount of
air time may be spent in the back-off process instead of data transmission, leading to wasted spectrum
resources. The opposite may also be true. If we simply control the contention topology of the network, the
transmission power settings may be such that users do not have sufficient noise resistance capability and thus
fall short of the theoretically achievable capacity. In this case, even though we may have successfully reduced
3the contention and saved a lot of air time, the quality of active transmissions (or on a per-transmission basis)
may be low.
In short, reducing transmission power has a dual effect on the MAC and PHY layers: it can help increase
spatial reuse order under CSMA/CA, but can at the same time decrease noise resistance capacity and
therefore the transmission capacity. A desirable solution should thus take both effects into consideration in
determining the optimal power control. This is strictly speaking not a cross-layer problem, as the only degree
of freedom in design resides with transmission power, i.e., there is no joint design or feedback between
different layers. This problem simply highlights the complexity in tuning certain design parameters, as the
change may manifest itself differently at different layers which could be self-defeating as illustrated above.
In this study we approach this problem by introducing a performance measure (or utility function) based
on the power-tune impact on both PHY and MAC layers simultaneously. An interesting technical aspect
of this formulation is the combination of both continuous (SNR and PHY) and discrete (MAC or graph-
based) elements in a single optimization problem. Not surprisingly, this leads to an intractable optimization
problem, whose properties and structures we then investigate to help construct good and efficient solution
techniques. Extensive simulation is conducted to verify the effectiveness and performance of our solution
approach. An equally important aspect of our study, besides solving the above optimization problem, is
to obtain insight into how the resulting power-tune differs from the two approaches outlined earlier, each
focusing on the effect on a single layer, respectively.
Our formulation and solution are given within a centralized framework. A natural next step is to examine
distributed implementations of the solution, and similar optimization problems when users are strategic.
These remain interesting directions of future research, but are out of the scope of the present paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the system model and problem
formulation, while Section III characterizes the optimal solution. Section VI provides extensive numerical
results to evaluate our approach. Section VII presents a literature review most relevant to the present study
and Section VIII concludes the paper.
4II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Preliminaries
Consider a WLAN network with N APs denoted by the set Ω = {1, 2, ..., N}. Each AP is associated
with a number of stations with whom it communicates. Denote an AP’s transmission power space (i.e.,
the set of power levels it may employ) by Qi, i ∈ Ω. Different from many prior works, here we do not
assume any finiteness of Qi; instead, we will show that the finiteness of the optimal power profile follows
naturally from our formulation. We will assume Qi, i ∈ Ω are all closed and use P i and P i to denote the
maximum and minimum value in Qi, respectively. The transmission power profile of all users is denoted
by P = [P1,P2, ...,PN ].
Each AP also has a certain attempt rate for channel access under IEEE 802.11, and these are denoted by
the vector p := [p1, p2, ..., pN ], also referred to as the attempt rate profile. Channel gain (or path loss) from
user i to j is denoted by hij . We will assume hij, i, j ∈ Ω stay unchanged during a single transmission;
alternatively, we may view hij as the expectation of channel dynamics. N0 denotes the average noise level,
and P ics denotes the carrier sensing (CS) threshold of the i−th AP.
For the rest of the paper we will use the terms AP and user interchangeably.
B. Contention domain
Due to the fact that many hardware/circuits put a requirement on CS signal’s strength, some CS signals
cannot be correctly decoded and the corresponding back-off actions will not be triggered; only those with
strength higher than the CS threshold can be correctly identified. We thus define two notions of a contention
domain for user/AP i. The first one ∆ri , the receive contention domain, is the set of users/APs whose CS
signals can be correctly decoded by user i; while the other ∆ti, the transmit contention domain, is the set
of users who can decode user i’s CS signals correctly. Mathematically we have
∆ri = {j : Pj · hji ≥ P ics, j ∈ Ω\{i}} (1)
∆ti = {j : Pi · hij ≥ Pjcs, j ∈ Ω\{i}} (2)
By definition, contention domain is closely related to spatial reuse. With a larger contention domain, the
degree of spatial reuse is potentially smaller around that user. Define ni(P) to be the number of competing
5users of user i under power profile P; i.e., ni(P) := |∆ri |. This will also be referred to as the contention
order for user i.
C. Neighborhood reaching threshold
Consider AP i and the maximum (resp. minimum) transmission power it can use without reaching (resp.
so that it can still reach) another AP k, expressed as follows (assumed to exist):
P−ik : = max{Pi : Pi · hik < Pkcs,Pi ∈ Qi} (3)
P+ik : = min{Pi : Pi · hik ≥ Pkcs,Pi ∈ Qi} . (4)
To make it complete for k = i we have
P−ii : = P i,P+ii := P i (5)
Denote the set of these neighbors reaching thresholds for AP i as
Q˜i = ∪k∈Ω{P−ik,P+ik}. (6)
Denote the neighbor reaching profile space for the whole network as
Q˜ := Q˜1 × Q˜2 × ...× Q˜N . (7)
Since we are considering a finite size network (i.e., the number of APs, N , is a finite positive integer), this
profile space is finite, i.e., |Q˜i| <∞, ∀i ∈ Ω, and consequently |Q˜| <∞.
D. A performance measure/utility function
From AP i’s point of view, its transmission power setting has the following implications:
I. Higher transmission power will increase AP i’s received SNR (SNRi) by its associated stations.
II. Higher transmission power will cause higher interference to APs outside ∆ri ∪∆ti.
III. Higher transmission power will add i to some other AP j’s contention domain.
6As a result, AP i’s perceived performance, or utility Ui, as a function of the transmission power profile
P and attempt rate profile p across all APs, may be captured by the following expression:
Ui(P,p) = Si(P,p) · Ci(P,p), i ∈ Ω, (8)
where Si is the “sharing” function representing AP i’s share of channel access under CSMA/CA-type of
collision avoidance mechanism, and Ci is the “capacity” function representing the rate/quality of active
transmissions under P and p.
Under 802.11, we can approximate Si using the probability of successful channel reservation given
by
∏
j∈∆ri
(1 − pj)pi, where the dependence on the transmission power profile P is implicit through the
contention domain ∆ri = ∆ri (P). Assuming a fair WLAN network with 0 < p1 = p2 = ... = pN = pc < 1,
we then have the following form of the sharing function:
Si(P,p) =
∏
j∈∆ri
(1− pj)pi = (1− pc)ni(P)pc, (9)
which approximates the air time share of AP i within its contention domain.
Ci is intended to capture the rate or capacity of active transmission attained by AP i. To make this
concrete, we will focus on the downlink capacity from the AP to its associated stations. As the stations’
locations can change dynamically and are often unknown, we will not explicitly model this level of detail
and simply assume that the stations are sufficiently close to their associated AP. Consequently, their capacity
may be approximated using the transmit power by the AP (rather than the received power at a station) and
the interference at the AP (rather than at a station), in the standard Shannon formula: (similar formulation
can also be found in [8]):
Ci(P,p) = log(1 + PiN0 +
∑
j∈∆¯ri∩∆¯
t
i
Sj(P,p) · Pj · hji ) , (10)
where ∆¯ri (∆¯ti) denotes the complement of AP i’s contention domains, i.e., ∆¯ri = Ω−i\∆ri , reflecting the fact
that the interference comes primarily from APs outside the contention domain as a result of the back-off
mechanism of IEEE 802.11 collision avoidance.
7III. THE OPTIMAL POWER-TUNE PROBLEM AND ITS CHARACTERIZATION
In this section, we formally define our optimization problem and do so in comparison with its single-
layer counterparts, i.e., that aim at only the PHY or MAC layer effect, respectively. We then characterize
its features using a two-user example.
A. Considering only PHY layer effects
When we limit our attention to PHY layer effects of power control, typically no contention is considered
and parallel transmissions are implicitly assumed. Therefore each single user’s transmissions will contribute
to other users noise/interference. Problems along this line have been well investigated in the literature, see
e.g., [2], [8]. Specifically these assumptions result in the following optimization problem
(PPHY) max ∑i∈Ω log(1 + PiN0+∑j 6=i Pj ·hji )
s.t. Pj ∈ Qi, ∀i ∈ Ω.
This rate maximization problem is in general hard to solve. Previous work has focused on different
approximation techniques, see e.g., [8]. In order to obtain comparable results in order to compare this
with our optimization formulation, in our numerical experiments (Section VI) we shall use the following
simple approximation
log(1 +
Pi
N0 +
∑
j 6=iPj · hji
) ≈ log( PiN0 )−
∑
j 6=iPj · hji
N0 (11)
Since both terms log( Pi
N0
) and −
∑
j 6=i Pj ·hji
N0
are concave, we now have an approximate/relaxed optimization
problem which is convex:
(R-PPHY) max ∑i∈Ω{log( PiN0 )−
∑
j 6=i Pj ·hji
N0
}
s.t. Pj ∈ Qi, ∀i ∈ Ω.
This problem can be efficiently solved using classical convex optimization techniques (assuming all Qi are
convex or piece-wise convex). These are used in our numerical results provided later, and the algorithmic
details are omitted for brevity.
8B. Considering only MAC layer effects
We next limit our attention to MAC layer effects of power control, in which case the objective is typically
to minimize the sum of contention orders over all users, given as follows:
min
∑
i∈Ω
ni(P) , (12)
see, e.g., a similar objective used in [10]. However, without any constraint on P , the above minimization
could lead to somewhat pathologic solutions, i.e., with very low power, we can obtain
∑
i∈Ω ni(P) ≈ 0
thereby achieving the minimum value. However, with very low transmission powers and relatively constant
background noise, each AP’s SNR is significantly impacted leading to poor transmission performance.
Consequently, in order to make this model comparable with others considered in our numerical experiments,
we will instead consider a similar optimization problem with an SNR constraint. Specifically, we will try
to minimize the total contention order within the network, subject to a minimum requirement on each AP’s
SNR, as shown below:
(PMAC) min ∑i∈Ω ni(P)
s.t. Pi
N0+
∑
j∈∆¯r
i
∩∆¯t
i
Sj(P,p)·Pj ·hji
≥ SNR0,
∀i ∈ Ω.
Here we use SNR0 to denote some baseline SNR that needs to be met at each AP’s transmission.
The above problem has a mixture of a combinatorial term and continuous term in the following sense:
while the SNR is continuous w.r.t. setting transmission power Pi, the contention domains ∆is are discrete.
Thus the problem is hard to solve in general. We thus consider a relaxation of the above problem. Since
we have
Pj · hji < P ics, ∀j ∈ ∆¯ri ∩ ∆¯ti , (13)
the inequality below holds immediately
∑
j∈∆¯ri∩∆¯
t
i
Sj(P,p) · Pj · hji <
∑
j∈∆¯ri∩∆¯
t
i
Sj(P,p) · P ics (14)
9Moreover, we have
Pi
N0 +
∑
j∈∆¯ri∩∆¯
t
i
Pj · hji >
Pi
N0 +
∑
j∈∆¯ri∩∆¯
t
i
Sj(P,p) · P ics
. (15)
Thus, we have the following relaxed problem that are solvable:
(R-PMAC) min ∑i∈Ω ni(P)
s.t. Pi
N0+
∑
j∈∆¯r
i
∩∆¯t
i
Sj(P,p)·Pics
≥ SNR0, ∀i ∈ Ω.
Theorem 3.1: In solving R-PMAC there is no loss of optimality to limit our attention to the space Q˜,
i.e., if an optimal solution exists, we can always find an optimal solution within the space Q˜.
Proof 1: Suppose there is an optimal power profile with some element, say P∗j /∈ Q˜j . Then consider
relaxing/increasing P∗j to the nearest P−jk, ∀k ∈ Ω. Note that such a change would not modify the contention
topology and thus all ni values remain the same, without violating the corresponding SNR constraint. Thus
we have found an optimal solution within Q˜.
Remark 3.2: This theorem allows us to focus on a finite set of solutions instead of all possible solutions.
C. Considering dual effects
We now formalize the optimal power-tune problem outlined earlier that takes into account both the PHY
and MAC layer effects. Specifically, we will seek centralized solutions to the following social welfare
maximization problem:
(P) max U =∑i∈Ω Ui(P,p)
s.t. Pi ∈ Qi, i ∈ Ω.
As the power profile space Q := Q1 × Q2 × ... × QN is potentially infinite, and U is in general a non-
convex and non-differentiable function w.r.t. P , the optimization problem is NP-hard. To illustrate, Fig. 1
shows three examples of the sum utility as a function of the power Pi of AP i, under different parameter
settings. As can be seen, there lack properties commonly used to derive efficient solution techniques (e.g.,
differentiability, convexity). There are, however, some interesting features such as the prominent step shape
shown in the result. This observation motivated key results in the subsequent subsections.
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Fig. 1. Examples of U w.r.t. a specific Pi
D. An illustrative example: two-user case with centralized solution
Consider the special case with N = 2 and pc = 12 , i.e., a system of two users attempting to access the
channel each with probability 1/2. To gain some insight into the solution to the corresponding optimization
problem (P), we discuss the following four cases.
CASE 1. P1 ≤ P−12,P2 ≤ P−21
In this case neither user is in the other’s CS range and thus the objective function becomes
log(1 +
P1
N0 + 14 · P2 · h21
) + log(1 +
P2
N0 + 14 · P1 · h12
) (16)
We first fix P2 and analyze the above function w.r.t. P1. Basic algebraic calculation shows that the above
objective function is equivalent to (noting h12 = h21 and denote h := 14 · h12 = 14 · h21)
log
{
1 +
1
N0 + P2 · h(P1 + P2/h+
N0 + P2 · h− P2 · N0/h
N0 + P1 · h )
}
Due to the monotonicity of the log function, the optimization problem is equivalent to maximizing
P1 + P2/h+ N0 + P2 · h− P2 · N0/hN0 + P1 · h . (17)
If N0 + P2 · h − P2 · N0/h < 0, then Eqn. (17) is strictly increasing w.r.t. P1 and thus P∗1 = P−12. If
N0+P2 ·h−P2 ·N0/h ≥ 0, then Eqn. (17) is convex and the maximizer is an end point, i.e., P∗1 ∈ {P1,P−12}.
By symmetry we have similar results for user 2.
CASE 2. P1 ≥ P+12,P2 ≤ P−21
In this case user 1 is in user 2’s receive contention domain, but not the other way round. It follows that
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the objective function in this case reduces to the following:
log(1 +
P1
N0 ) +
1
2
log(1 +
P2
N0 ) (18)
Obviously this function is increasing w.r.t. P1 and P2 and therefore we have P∗1 = P1,P∗2 = P−21.
CASE 3. P1 ≤ P−12,P2 ≥ P+21
This is essentially the same as CASE 2 and thus omitted.
CASE 4. P1 ≥ P+12,P2 ≥ P+21
In this case both users are in each other’s contention domain, and the resulting objective function is
1
2
log(1 +
P1
N0 ) +
1
2
log(1 +
P2
N0 ). (19)
It is then straightforward to show that P∗1 = P1 and P∗2 = P2.
The above example aims at conveying the intuition that the optimal power levels are likely to be at the
neighborhood reaching thresholds or the maximum power limit. The next section shows that we can indeed
restrict our attention to a finite set of these thresholds in search of an optimal solution.
IV. SOLUTION APPROACH : A CENTRALIZED VIEW
A. A Lower bound problem
Recall that for j ∈ ∆¯ri , we have Pj ·hji < P ics, i.e., the received signal strength is below the CS threshold.
Thus
log(1 +
Pi
N0 +
∑
j∈∆¯ri∩∆¯
t
i
Sj(P,p) · Pj · hji )
> log(1 +
Pi
N0 +
∑
j∈∆¯ri∩∆¯
t
i
Sj(P,p) · P ics
) . (20)
We use this relationship to form the following lower bound problem.
(PL) max UL =
∑
i∈Ω(1− pc)ni(P)pc·
log(1 + Pi
N0+
∑
j∈∆¯r
i
∩∆¯t
i
Sj(P,p)·Pics
)
s.t. Pi ∈ Qi, ∀i ∈ Ω.
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Lemma 4.1: For an optimal solution P∗ to (PL), we have P∗ ∈ Q˜. That is, there is no loss of optimality
is restricting the solution space to Q˜ in searching for an optimal solution.
Proof 2: For AP i, suppose there exists a P∗i 6∈ Q˜i. This means one of the following must be true: (1)
P+ik < P∗i < P−ij for some (k, j), (2) P∗i < P−ij for all j, and (3) P+ik < P∗i for all k. For the fist two
cases, if we increase Pi from P∗i to P−ij , the resulting contention topology remain unchanged, i.e., the terms
Sj , nj(P), ∀j ∈ Ω stay unchanged, but Pi is now bigger and UL is strictly increasing in Pi. This contradicts
the optimality of P∗, so the first two cases cannot be true. If it’s the third case and P+ik < P∗i for all k, then
increasing Pi from P∗i to P i results in the same argument as above, so (3) also cannot be true, completing
the proof.
Remark 4.2: When P ics is small or when the network is dense and large (i.e., with a large N), the lower
bound problem will provide a good approximation for the original problem.
B. An Upper bound problem
We similarly form an upper bound to the original objective function:
log(1 +
Pi
N0 +
∑
j∈∆¯ri∩∆¯
t
i
Sj(P,p) · Pj · hji )
≤ PiN0 +
∑
j∈∆¯ri∩∆¯
t
i
Sj(P,p) · Pj · hji · log 2, (21)
and we have the following upper bound problem
(PU) max UU =
∑
i∈Ω(1− pc)ni(P)pc
· Pi
N0+
∑
j∈∆¯r
i
∩∆¯t
i
Sj(P,p)·Pj ·hji
s.t. Pi ∈ Qi, ∀i ∈ Ω.
Lemma 4.3: UU is piece-wise convex w.r.t. each Pi, i ∈ Ω.
Proof 3: Consider Pi and fix the transmission power of all other APs. Suppose Pi ∈ [P+ik,P−ij ] for some
k, j. Within this range, the contention topology remains the same, i.e., (1− pc)ni(P)pc is a constant for any
value Pi takes within this interval. Next consider the second term in UU . Pi appears in this term in two
forms: one as Pi
N0+
∑
l∈∆¯r
i
∩∆¯t
i
Sl(P,p)·Pl·hli
which is convex w.r.t. Pi, and the other as PlN0+∑m∈∆¯r
l
∩∆¯t
l
Sm(P,p)·Pm·hml
for some l such that i ∈ ∆¯rl ∩ ∆¯tl , in the form of Si(P,p) · Pi · hil; these terms are also convex w.r.t. Pi.
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As the sum of convex functions is convex, we have established the convexity of UU .
When P+ik < Pi for all k, UU is convex w.r.t. Pi over the interval [maxP+ik,P i] using the same argument
as above. Similarly, when Pi < P−ik , ∀k 6= i UU is convex w.r.t. Pi over the interval [P i,minP−ik].
Lemma 4.4: Suppose P∗U is the optimal solution to (PU), we have P∗U ∈ Q˜.
Proof 4: The result readily follows from Lemma 4.3 and the fact that optimal solution over a closed
interval for a convex function is an end point.
Remark 4.5: Since the linear approximation would perform better when Pi
N0+
∑
j∈∆¯r
i
∩∆¯t
i
Sj(P,p)·Pj ·hji
is small,
we know when the network size is large (i.e., N is large) and dense, the upper bound problem will provide
a good approximation for the original problem.
Remark 4.6: By finding the optimal solution for problems (PL) and (PU), we have the bounds for the
optimal solutions.
UL(P∗L) ≤ U(P∗) ≤ UU(P∗U) (22)
Meanwhile we can use P∗L and P∗U as approximate strategies for our original problem (P) with
U(P∗L) ≥ UL(P∗L), U(P∗U ) ≤ UU(P∗U) (23)
In next section we will focus on solving (PL) and (PU) instead of (P).
C. Greedy search
In solving (PL) and (PU) instead of the original (P), the problem reduces to searching over a finite
strategy space which can be done within a finite number of steps dependent on the size of the network.
For the lower bound problem (PL), the strategy space is on the order of O(NN ), while for the upper
bound problem (PU) the order is O((2N − 1)N). However with a large scale WLAN network (referring
to the number of APs in the network), these could still be excessively large even though finite. This is
the classical rollout problem in combinatorial optimization. Below we present a heuristic greedy approach,
which is shown later through numerical experiment to provide a near-optimal solution efficiently. The basic
idea of a greedy search method is to maximize the system’s total throughput w.r.t. a single variable at each
stage of the computation while keeping the others fixed. The details of this approach is shown in Algorithm
1, where the notation P−m denotes the power profile for all but AP m, and the objective function U()
14
denote either UU or UL depending on which problem ((PU) vs. (PL)) we are trying to solve.
Set Pi(0) = P i, ∀i ∈ Ω.
temp = U(P(0)), ǫ = temp, n = 0.
while ǫ > 0 do
n := n+ 1;
m := n mod N ;
Pm(n) = argmaxPm∈Q˜m U(Pm,P−m(n− 1));
for j = 1 : N do
if j 6= m
Pj(n) = Pj(n− 1);
end for
ǫ = |U(P(n))− temp|;
temp = U(P(n));
end
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode for Greedy Search
Lemma 4.7: The above greedy search terminates within a finite number of steps and reaches a local
optimal solution to (PL) and (PU).
D. Optimal search
In this part, we present a randomized search algorithm that guarantees convergence to the optimal solution
for (PL) and (PU). The algorithm works in rounds starting from AP 1 and computes the power for one AP
in each round. Denote the state of the system at round n as G(n) and G(n) := [P1(n),P2(n), ...,PN(n)].
Suppose at round n AP i’s (i.e., i = n mod N) power is being computed. Then AP i’s next power level
is updated using the following transition probability:
P(G(n + 1) = (P i,G−i(n))|G(n))
=
eU(P
i,G−i(n))/τ(n)
eU(Pi,G−i(n))/τ(n) + eU(G(n))/τ(n)
· 1Li ,
∀P i ∈ Q˜i,P i 6= Pi(n). (24)
with the probability of not changing the power level given as
P(G(n+ 1) = G(n)|G(n))
=
∑
Pi∈Q˜i,Pi 6=Pi(n)
eU(G(n))/τ(n)
eU(Pi,G−i(n))/τ(n) + eU(G(n))/τ(n)
· 1Li . (25)
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Here τ(n) := 1
n
is a positive smoothing factor and Li is a normalization factor for user i. This search
algorithm will be referred to as P RAND. As before, the function U() in the above equation is the objective
in problem (PL) (resp. (PU)) if the algorithm is used to search for an optimal solution to problem (PL)
(resp. (PU)).
Set Pi(0) = P i, ∀i ∈ Ω.
temp = U(P(0)), ǫ = temp, n = 0.
thrs = 10−4. (some small positive value)
while ǫ > thrs do
n := n+ 1 ;
m := n mod N ;
Set Pm(n) = Pm with probability eU(P
m,G−m(n))/τ(n)
eU(P
m,G−m(n))/τ(n)+eU(G(n))/τ(n)
· 1
Lm
, ∀Pm ∈ Q˜m,Pm 6= Pm(n).
While Pm(n) stays unchanged with probability
∑
Pm∈Q˜i,Pm 6=Pm(n)
eU(G(n))/τ(n)
eU(P
m,G−i(n))/τ(n)+eU(G(n))/τ(n)
· 1
Lm
.
for j = 1 : N do
if j 6= m
Pj(n) = Pj(n− 1);
end for
ǫ = |U(P(n))− temp|;
temp = U(P(n));
end
Algorithm 2: Pseudocode for Randomized Search
Theorem 4.8: P RAND converges to the optimal solution to the two approximate problems (PL) and
(PU).
Proof 5: Due to the finiteness of the strategy spaces of all APs, we can form an N-dimensional positive
recurrent Markov chain, with state at time n given by G(n); there exists a stationary distribution of this
Markov chain.
We next show that the following probability distribution π over the state space Q˜ is the stationary
distribution of this Markov Chain.
π(G) = T · eU(G)/τ(n), ∀G ∈ Q˜ , (26)
where T is the normalization constant. As
∑
G∈Q˜ π(G) = 1 the above is equivalent to T =
∑
G∈Q˜ e
U(G)/τ(n) ,
and thus
π(G) = e
U(G)/τ(n)∑
G∈Q˜ e
U(G)/τ(n)
, ∀G ∈ Q˜ , (27)
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To prove this, consider the detailed balance equations. Specifically consider two states G1 and G2. Note that
only when G1 and G2 differ in one element is the transition probability is positive; otherwise the transition
probability is zero. We would like to show the following
π(G1) · P(G2|G1) = π(G2) · P(G1|G2), ∀G1,G2. (28)
When there is only one element difference between the two states we know
P(G2|G1) = L · e
U(G2/τ(n))
eU(G2/τ(n)) + eU(G1/τ(n))
(29)
P(G1|G2) = L · e
U(G1/τ(n))
eU(G1/τ(n)) + eU(G2/τ(n))
(30)
with L being some constant. Therefore (28) holds readily. It follows from standard result that π is indeed
the stationary distribution.
Denote G∗ = {P∗} as the set of global maximizers; i.e., the set of power profiles that maximizes our
objectives in (PL) and (PU) respectively. Suppose there is a state G ′ /∈ G∗. We have
π(G ′) = e
U(G
′
)/τ(n)∑
G∈Q˜ e
U(G)/τ(n)
=
1∑
G∈Q˜ e
(U(G)−U(G
′
))/τ(n)
(31)
For G ∈ G∗ we have U(G)− U(G ′) > 0 and
lim
n→∞
(U(G)− U(G ′))/τ(n)→∞ (32)
and hence we have limn→∞ π(G ′) = 0 ; furthermore by [1] we establish the following
lim
n→∞
π(G ∈ G∗) = 1 (33)
i.e., the Markovian chain converges to the maximization states with probability 1.
V. SOLUTION APPROACH : A DECENTRALIZED VIEW
A. A game theoretic view
Starting from this section we analyze a strategic network for our problem. We first form a game theoretical
model. Instead of group of users sharing a common goal, we assume the network users being strategic, i.e.
with each one being rational. Define ∆Q := ∆Q1 ×∆Q2 × ...∆QN . Here ∆Qi is the probability measure
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over action space Qi. Then (Ω,∆Qi,Ui) defines our game. We call this game (G1). We investigate the
Nash Equilibrium (N.E.) of above game. To be specific, we show there is one unique N.E. exists for above
game.
Proposition 5.1: The only N.E. for (G1) is P = [P1,P2, ...,PN ].
Proof 6: First we show P is a N.E.. Without of losing generality, consider AP i. As Si(P,p) is independent
with Pi and Ci is a strictly increasing function w.r.t. Pi, by unilaterally deviating from P i to some lower
power profile P ′i , Ui will decrease. Therefore we proved P is a N.E.. From above arguments we also
established the uniqueness immediately.
B. Mechanism design with perfect monitoring
Starting from this part we solve our problem with mechanism design’s approach. First of all since we
are more interested in a dense network with well interacted APs we make the following assumption: for
each user i, there is at least one j such that
Pj · hji ≥ P ics (34)
i.e., for any AP it can be reached by at least one another AP within its carrier sensing range. Consider the
case where there is such AP that nobody can reach him and let’s call it a stand-alone AP. This AP can be
thought of disconnected from the network and it cannot be controlled by the other APs’ behaviors; or in a
homogeneous network, this stand-alone AP will not contribute to other people’s utility in a significant way
and thus we could screen this case out and focus on the rest well connected APs.
We first start with the mechanism design problem with perfect monitoring; here by perfect monitoring
we mean each user can monitor other users’ transmission power in a perfect way without noise. As we
discussed in last section, the socially optimal power allocation strategy profile may not be a NE of the
multiuser system. Meanwhile, it is easy to check each user’s utility function is a strictly increasing function
w.r.t. the attempt rate p. Therefore in a decentralized system, each user has two incentives to deviate from
our socially optimal strategy profile:
I. Deviate from pre-specified transmission power to get a higher SNR.
II. Deviate from pc to get more air time.
In this section we consider the optimization problem from a long run perspective for each user, i.e., we
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consider the following programming problem
(P ∗i ) max
∑∞
t=0 δ
t · Ui(P(t),p(t))
s.t. Pi(t) ∈ Qi, ∀i ∈ Ω, t = 0, 1, 2, ...
Here δ is the discount factor satisfying 0 < δ < 1 and it models users or system’s patience. Denote the
social optimal power setting as (P∗,p). We define the following states of APs:
S.1. S0: The initial state; at S0 the group of APs follow the strategy profile (P∗,p).
S.2. Si(t), t = 1, 2, ..., L, i ∈ Ω: Punishment phases for user i. At state Si(t) APs follow the specified
strategy profile (P , (p˜i, [p˜ji]j 6=i)). Here L is some finite positive integer which is the length of
punishment phases.
Consider the following mechanism.
M.1. APs start at state S0. If all APs follow the strategy profile (P∗,p) specified for S0, at next time
APs will keep playing the strategy profile.
M.2. If there is one AP, for example i deviated from (P∗,p) at time t, starting from time t+1, system
goes into state Si(1) and play strategy profile (P, (p˜i, [p˜ji]j 6=i).
M.3. At state Si(t), t = 1, 2, ..., L − 1, if all APs follow the specified strategy, system goes to state
Si(t+1) at next time point; at Si(L), if all APs follow the specified strategy, system goes to state
S0.
M.4. At state Si(t), t = 1, 2, ..., L, if AP i deviates from the specified strategy profile, system goes to
state Si(1) at next time. If AP j 6= i deviates, system goes to Sj(1).
We refer this mechanism as (MPM). Now we present some requirements on choosing over ([p˜i]i∈Ω, [p˜j,k]j 6=k).
A.1. [p˜ji]j 6=i should be large enough to deter user i. Notice that with large enough [p˜ji]j 6=i (with each
elements close enough to 1) we have
Si(P, p˜i, [p˜ji]j 6=i)→ 0,Ui(P, p˜i, [p˜ji]j 6=i)→ 0 (35)
This essentially follows the intuition that when some user else becomes excessively aggressive,
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AP i will lose most of its airtime (throttled by other users) and thus results a significant decrease
of its achievable throughput. Therefore with appropriately chosen parameter set p˜ we can get
Ui(P, p˜i, [p˜ji]j 6=i) < Ui(P∗,p) (36)
A.2. A second restriction over selecting ([p˜i]i∈Ω, [p˜j,k]j 6=k) is that each AP i would like to stay at other
users’ punishment phase instead of its own, i.e.,
Ui(P , p˜j, [p˜kj]k 6=j) ≥ Ui(P, p˜i, [p˜ki]k 6=i) (37)
Through simple algebra we can show the existence of such strategy profiles w.r.t. APs’ attempt
rate. The details are thus omitted here.
A.3. A third restriction on selecting ([p˜i]i∈Ω, [p˜j,k]j 6=k) we put is as following.
Ui(P,pi = 1, [p˜ji]j 6=i)− Ui(P , p˜i, [p˜ji]j 6=i)
< Ui(P,p)− Ui(P, p˜i, [p˜ji]j 6=i) (38)
i.e., [p˜i]i is large enough. We will discuss the intuition later.
Remark 5.2: It can be shown a trivial combination for such ([p˜i]i∈Ω, [p˜j,k]j 6=k) is setting each element
to be 1, i.e., ([p˜i]i∈Ω, [p˜j,k]j 6=k) = 1. Here 1 is the all-one vector with corresponding length. However we
do not want these punishments to be too harsh and these three requirements help establish our mechanism
while keep the punishments as light as possible.
Now we show with appropriately chosen parameter, (MPM) enforces the strategy profile (P∗, p) for all
APs.
Theorem 5.3: (P∗, p) is enforceable under mechanism (MPM) with large enough δ and appropriately
chosen L.
Proof 7: To prove the enforceability of (P∗, p) we need to check no AP would like to go for a one step
deviation at any state of (MPM) (according to the one step deviation principle ).
First check state S0. Consider an arbitrary AP i. Denote the utility from following the social optimal
strategy profile for AP i as U∗i . Then by following the specified strategy at S0, the long run accumulated
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utility for AP i is given by
Ui(S0) = δ0 · U∗i + ...+ δt · U∗i + ... =
1
1− δU
∗
i (39)
Next check the utility for AP i by deviating to another profile (P ′i , p′i). Remember due to the finiteness of
Qi and p (0 < p < 1), we have some finite positive number Mi such that
Ui((P ′i , p
′
i), (P,p)−i) ≤Mi (40)
Also denote the utility of AP i of adopting (P , p˜i, [p˜ji]j 6=i) at punishment phase Si(t) as Upi . Then by
deviation we know the aggregated utility for AP i is
Udi (S0) ≤Mi + δ · Upi + δ2 · Upi + ...
+ δL · Upi + δL+1 · U∗i + ... (41)
Then we have
Ui(S0)− Udi (S0) ≥ (U∗i −Mi) + (U∗i − Upi ) ·
δ − δL+1
1− δ (42)
As U∗i −Mi ≤ 0,U∗i − Upi > 0, with a large enough δ and L we could have
δ − δL+1
1− δ → L, (U
∗
i − Upi ) · L ≥Mi − U∗i (43)
Denote a pair of suitable (δ, L) as (δ1, L1) and we proved with (δ1, L1) there will be no profitable one step
deviation for any AP at state S0.
Next we analyze the punishment phases. Consider Si(t). First notice that obviously all APs at any
punishment phase with any stage Sj(t), ∀j ∈ Ω, t = 1, 2, ..., L there is no incentive to deviate their power
strategy. This follows from the observation each AP i’s utility Ui is strictly increasing w.r.t. Pi. Thus no
user would deviate from their maximum transmission power as used in the specified strategy profile at
Sj(t). Therefore we only need to consider APs deviating with attempt rate p.
First consider AP i. Denote Ui(Si) as the utility AP i can get by following Si. By increasing its attempt
rate, AP i will increase its utility. But again due to the finiteness of pi we have a upper bound for this
one step increase and we denote it as M ′i . Then suppose at stage t, AP i’s utility by following specified
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strategy is given by
Ui(Si(t)) =Ui(Si) + δ · Ui(Si) + ...
+ δL−t−1Ui(Si) + δL−tUi(S0) + ... (44)
and by deviating we have
Udi (Si(t)) ≤M
′
i + δ · Ui(Si) + ...
+ δLUi(Si) + δL+1Ui(S0) + ... (45)
Then take the difference we have
Ui(Si(t))− Udi (Si(t))
≥ Ui(Si)−M ′i + δ · (Ui(P)− Ui(Si)) (46)
As 0 < M ′i−Ui(Si) < Ui(P)−Ui(Si) and with a large enough δ we have Ui(Si)−M ′i+δ ·(Ui(P)−Ui(Si)) >
0.
The last step is to check whether AP j 6= i would deviate at state Si(t) or not. As we already put
constraints on ([p˜i]i∈Ω, [p˜j,k]j 6=k) such that each player would rather stay at other AP’s punishment phase
instead of their own, hereby AP j would not deviate.
C. Mechanism design with imperfect monitoring
In this subsection we analyze the problem that each user has imperfect monitoring over other users’
transmission power at each decision period. In practice, the monitoring over other APs’ deviation cannot
be done in real time dues to multiple sources of noises, e.g., thermal noise. Therefore without a central
monitor, each user needs to precisely detect a deviation by its own observations.
To be specific we consider the following noise model : Instead of being Pj · hji, the received power at
user i (transmitted from user j) is given by
Pj · hji +Ni (47)
here Ni is a noise source at user i’s receiver side which follows a Gaussian distribution, Ni ∼ N (0, σi).
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Moreover we assume any pair (Ni,Nj), i, j ∈ Ω are correlated with correlation matrix Σij :
Σij =

 σii σij
σji σjj

 .
For each user we propose the following mechanism. Each user takes a threshold ǫi for detection. If
|Pji − Pj · hji| ≤ ǫi, user i will hold the punishment while taking the user j being non-deviating. On the
other hand if |Pji−Pj · hji| > ǫi, user i will initialize the punishment phase for user j. Therefore we have
P
n
ij = P(|Pji − Pj · hji| ≤ ǫi) = 2Φi(ǫi)− 1 (48)
P
p
ij = 1− P(|Pji − Pj · hji| ≤ ǫi) = 2− 2Φi(ǫi) (49)
Here Pnij is the probability of detecting no deviation while P
p
ij is the probability of positive detection. We
name this mechanism (MIM); and similarly with (MPM) we have enforceability as following.
Theorem 5.4: (P∗, p) is enforceable under mechanism (MIM) with large enough δ, appropriately chosen
L and positive correlated noise sources.
Proof 8: To see this threshold based detection strategy is enforceable, we need to show:
I. User i would like to adopt the threshold based detection strategy.
II. User will not take advantage of this threshold based strategy of other users.
For I, we can design a similar punishment phases and punishment strategies to deter users from deviating
from the pre-specified strategy.
Lemma 5.5: Users will not deviate from the pre-specified threshold strategy.
Proof 9: Denote the event user i detects a deviation as Ei and the event for no detection triggered as E¯i.
We make the following assumptions over Σij so that
P(Ei|Ej) > P(E¯i|Ej),P(Ej|Ei) > P(E¯j|Ei) (50)
Or equivalently P(Ei|Ej) > 12 , ∀i, j ∈ Ω; and we call the noise sources are positively correlated with
each other. We show an example as following to demonstrate what kinds of noise resources have positive
correlation.
Example 1: . Bi-variate Gaussian Distribution
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Consider
Σij =

 1 ρij
ρij 1

 .
The sufficient condition for a positive correlation is given as (algebraic details omitted for concise presen-
tation)
Φ(
ǫi −√ρijǫj√
1− ρ2ij
) + Φ(
ǫi +
√
ρijǫj√
1− ρ2ij
) > 1 +
1
2
(51)
Following which a more loose condition comes as
Φ(ǫ · 1−
√
ρij√
1− ρ2ij
) >
3
4
(52)
Therefore following right after Equation (52) a simple and sufficient condition for the positive correlation
is
ǫi = ǫj , ρij → 1 (53)
and ǫi, i ∈ Ω are properly chosen. The results show that in a network with homogeneous noise sources
we need the correlation factor to be high enough. This follows the intuition of designing deviation-proof
mechanisms for private imperfect monitoring problems: only when the correlation of private observations
are highly positive correlated.
Therefore when a user deviates, the probability of being detected by other users becomes higher than
sticking with prescribed strategy. As long as we have a harsh and long enough punishment phase for each
users, nobody will deviate. The design details follow similar path with (MIM) as in the perfect monitoring
section and thus omitted.
Now we consider II and particularly we would like to see nobody could be able to take use of the “cushion”
tolerance of other users by the threshold policy.
Lemma 5.6: No user will deviate to take use of the threshold detection strategy of other users.
Proof 10: Without losing generality, consider user i. Suppose user i increase P∗i to P∗i + τ . Denote the
benefits of the deviation for user i as ∆ Ui(τ). Firstly with the change, at user j 6= i’s side, the probability
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of punishment initialized becomes
P
p,τ
ji = 1− P(−ǫj ≤ Nj + τ · hij ≤ ǫj)
= 2− (Φj(ǫj + τ · hij) + Φj(ǫj − τ · hij)) (54)
By basic algebra we can show (details omitted)
2− (Φj(ǫj + τ · hij) + Φj(ǫj − τ · hij))
> 2− 2 · Φj(ǫj) (55)
i.e., Pp,τji > P
p
ji; and furthermore we have
∂(Pp,τji −P
p
ji)
∂ǫj
< 0. The intuition here is when ǫj is smaller, user i
would be detected with transmit power change τ more easily. Therefore by designing appropriate detection
thresholds ǫj , j ∈ Ω and punishment phases with large enough δ and L we have the following
(Pp,τ − Pp){ (U∗i − Upi ) + δ(U∗i − Upi ) + ...+ δL−1(U∗i − Upi )︸ ︷︷ ︸
L
}
> ∆ Ui(ǫ) (56)
Therefore each user would be deterred from deviating under this threshold enabled detection mechanism.
Theorem 5.7: The (MIM) help increases system performance compared with (MPM) under a imperfect
monitoring system.
Proof 11: We sketch the basic idea here. Obviously by introducing in the ǫ tolerance threshold we
decreased the false alarm probability. As the network performance degradation caused by punishment is
more severe than the degradation by the other users’ slight deviation (light deviation under tolerance) or
by the noise, we know the (MIM) helps improve system performance.
VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we provide simulation results to show system performance under the greedy and ran-
domized search algorithms (denoted as “Greedy” and “P RAND” in the figures, respectively). We further
compare them with the maximum transmission power strategy (“Max”), PPHY and PMAC respectively. The
WLAN network’s topology used in the experiment is randomly generated, with 10 APs placed according
to a uniform distribution in a square area; this topology is shown in Fig.2.
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Fig. 2. Topology of the AP Network
A. Optimization with dual effects
We begin by comparing the computed power levels and the resulting system-wide throughput under the
greedy and randomized search algorithms and the fixed, maximum power scheme.
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Fig. 3. Output power levels under Greedy Search & P RAND.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of system-wide throughput.
For the first set of results, we fix pc = 0.6 and a maximum transmission power level of 15 for all APs. The
resulting optimal power profile is depicted in Fig.3. Here to get the “optimal solution” we utilize P RAND
to solve (PL) and (PU) separately and then choose the one that gives us a better total throughput. We see
that in this case APs (8, 9, 10)’s power levels are far short of the maximum level. This reflects the need
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to avoid excessive interference with each other as they are clustered in a relatively crowded neighborhood.
APs (2, 4) are sitting relatively “alone” and thus they could transmit at a higher power. Similar observations
can be made at each AP.
Next, the system performance is shown in Fig. 4 as a function of the attempt rate pc. It is interesting to note
the opposite trends exhibited by using optimal power tuning vs. always using maximum power levels as the
attempt rate increases. As the network gets busier (more congested with higher attempt rate), the maximum
power levels exacerbates the problem and the system throughput degrades even though the APs are trying
harder. On the other hand, using optimal power-tune, as the network becomes more congested, the APs
react by decreasing their transmission powers appropriately so that the system throughput actually improves.
By either the greedy search or the randomized search algorithm, our optimal power-tune problem helps
achieve a significant throughput performance improvement compared to the static maximum transmission
power scheme.
We end this part with a look into the convergence performance of P RAND, shown in Fig.5. It is seen
that our randomized search algorithm converges quickly to the end solution; under the same simulation
setting, the greedy policy converges to a solution of system throughput at around 1.6.
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Fig. 5. Convergence of P RAND
B. Compare with PPHY
We next compare our optimization model with dual effect to the model given by PPHY, which tries to
maximize the total rate at the physical layer without considering contention. The achievable throughput at
each AP node (under attempt rate pc = 0.6 ) is shown in Fig. 6 while the transmission power returned by
PPHY vs. that by P RAND is shown in Fig. 7.
We see a clear difference in how power levels are tuned and the resulting throughput across different AP
nodes. The reason is that under PPHY each AP treats all other APs as noise resources. However, due to
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Fig. 7. power-tune results
CSMA/CA, no parallel transmission would be allowed for APs within the carrier sensing range and thus
the first-order noises (those from the closest neighbors) could be removed. Therefore APs could increase
their power to some extent without contributing too much to their neighbors’ noise level. This is why we
observe a few APs with much higher power under P RAND than under PPHY. By contrast, with only
PHY layer optimization APs cannot take full advantages of the noise-free property of CSMA, and therefore
act conservatively.
To make our comparison complete we present the total system throughput performance in Fig. 8. We see
PPHY is clearly out-performed by our optimization model especially under higher attempt rate.
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 11
1.5
2
2.5
p
c
Ne
tw
ork
 Th
rou
gh
pu
t
 
 
PPHY
P_RAND
Fig. 8. Comparison of network’s total throughput
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C. Compare with PMAC
We perform a similar comparison with PMAC. We start with a comparison of overall contention order
under different SNR constraints in Fig.9 (under attempt rate pc = 0.6, same for Fig.10). With a higher base
SNR, the required transmission power is potentially higher under PMAC, and thus the total contention
order increases. The contention order under P RAND on the other hand stays constant.
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Fig. 9. Contention order comparison
We see that in order to reduce the contention order the APs again act rather conservatively in reducing
their power levels. This leads to a drop in noise resistance and the overall network throughput, as shown
in Fig.10 and Fig. 11, respectively.
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Fig. 10. APs’ individual throughput
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VII. RELATED WORKS
There have been many classical PHY layer power-tune studies using Shannon’s capacity formula. For
example, Kim et al. investigated a transmit power and carrier sensing threshold tuning problem for improving
spatial reuse in [3]. Chiang et al. looked into the transmit power control problem through management of
interference, energy and connectivity in [2]. In [5], Phan et al. investigate distributed power control problem
on physical layer; a distributed algorithm is given and critical performance criteria, such as convergence
are analyzed. In [11], Tan et al. analyze several multi-user spectrum management problems with focus on
power control.
More recently, power control problems have been analyzed under game theoretical framework. Sharma et
al. proposed a game theoretical approach for decentralized power allocation in [6]. In [9], a congestion game
model is proposed to analyze power control problem as a form of resource allocation. Equilibrium strategies
have been given under certain assumptions. In [12], a power control problem is modeled as repeated games
with strategic users and intervention theory is proposed to induce target strategy from users. Imperfect
monitoring repeated game model is analyzed in [13] with the assumption of a Local Spectrum Server
(LSS). In [10], Wan et al. consider a power control problem w.r.t. reducing contention order on the link
layer while keeping the physical layer interference under certain levels.
In terms of computation, for standard integer optimization (or combinatorial optimization) problems
researchers typically seek relaxation to convert the problem into a continuous problem in the hope it can
be solved by standard LP or convex algorithms; in [4], [7], [14], efficient search algorithms have been
proposed to tackle finite space optimization problems.
VIII. CONCLUSION
With the proliferation of densely-deployed WLANs, power tuning becomes a critical problem as it has
major impacts on SNR as well as contention levels in these networks. Prior works mostly focused on one
of these two issues in pursuit of either higher throughput or lower contention level, but not both.
In this paper, we have investigated the network throughput optimization problem by optimizing both
spatial reuse (MAC) and SNR (PHY) performance at the same time. We have presented the complexity of
solving the joint optimization problem and derived approximations to make it tractable. Then, by analyzing
the problem structure, we have proposed efficient and near-optimal solutions. In order to demonstrate the
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effectiveness of our approach, we compared our results with several models optimizing on only either PHY
or MAC layer. A clear advantage has been demonstrated for the cross-layer approach.
In the second part, we first show that the N.E. for the decentralized WLAN appears to be inefficient;
then we show specific punishment mechanism can be designed to enforce the social near-optimal solution
with our system under both perfect and imperfect monitoring environment.
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